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The long-running debate concerning the scope of the economic loss
rule’ presents issues which are important in themselves and as illustrations
of broader questions.2 Litigants and commentators champion the opposing
schools of thought through close analysis of precedent;3 the exchange of
views as to the nature of tort law and contract law;4 and occasionally,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The long-running debate concerning the scope of the economic loss
rule' presents issues which are important in themselves and as illustrations
1. The significance of the economic loss rule is that a buyer seeking recovery for the
loss caused by product failure must plead the cause in warranty or contract. In most
jurisdictions, the buyer cannot recover if the event did not cause personal injury or damage
to property other than the product itself. A recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court is
representative. The plaintiff alleged flaws in concrete caused the walls and ceilings of a
condominium to crack, and ultimately pieces fell, narrowly missing residents; however, there
were no actual injuries. Casa Clara Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons,
Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993). The economic loss rule prohibited recovery because the
product did not cause personal injury or damage to anything other than itself. Id. at 1246
(citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)); Danforth
v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194 (Del. 1992) (treating sovereign error as exception
to economic loss rule); AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla.
1987); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987));
cf Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213, 217-18
(Wis. 1989); Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 444 N.W.2d 743, 747
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989). Note, it is sometimes suggested that a better term would be
"commercial loss." See the opinion of Judge Posner in Miller v. United States Steel Corp.:
The Millers are attempting to use tort law to recover the cost of replacing a
defective product sold to them for use in their business. This cost is called in
law an "economic loss," to distinguish it from an injury to the plaintiffs person
or property (property other than the product itself), the type of injury on which
a products liability suit usually is founded. It would be better to call it a
"commercial loss," not only because personal injuries and especially property
losses are economic losses, too-they destroy values which can be and are
monetized-but also, and more important, because tort law is a superfluous and
inapL tool for resolving purely commercial disputes. We have a body of law
designed for such disputes. It is called contract law. Products liability law has
evolved into a specialized branch of tort law for use in cases in which a
defective product caused, not the usual commercial loss, but a personal injury
to a consumer or bystander.
Miller, 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990).
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of broader questions.2 Litigants and commentators champion the opposing
schools of thought through close analysis of precedent;3 the exchange of
views as to the nature of tort law and contract law;4 and occasionally,
economic analysis.5 Their heartfelt arguments reflect origins in the distinct,
self-sufficient assumptions and insights characteristic of commercial and
product liability law. Perhaps, as a result, neither side answers the others'
contentions directly.6
Those who favor abolishing the rule use an account of a buyer's
predicament as prelude. Once the stage is set, there follows an assertion
that an otherwise dispositive point of law-a statute of limitations, or
perhaps precedent as to the enforceability of waiver-should not apply to the
particular case. Ultimately, references to the humanitarian purposes of
2. SeeNeibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992); Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Recoveryfor Damage to ProductAlone, 72 A.L.R.4TH
12 (1989).
3. See Steven G.M. Stein et al., A Blueprint for the Duties and Liabilities of Design
Professionals After Moorman, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 163 (1984) (discussing a painstaking
effort to reconcile the law of professional malpractice with distinctions between contract and
tort law established by Illinois case law).
4. Some courts and scholars are concerned the possible expansion of the tort system
would distort the laboriously worked out balances of the U.C.C. See Sarah B. Parker, Note,
Economic Loss in Product Liability: Strict Liability or the Uniform Commercial Code, 28
B.C. L. REV. 383 (1987) (suggesting rough categorization of those who would create a
limitation to economic loss rule on the basis of the type of plaintiff and those who would do
so on the basis of type of injury). A University of Pennsylvania article supports the general
definition of economic loss which plaintiffs' advocates offer. See Comment Manufacturers'
Liability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 539 (1966). However, the author concludes on a broader issue: "[T]he tort
rationale of risk distribution and the doctrine of assumption of risk, while appropriate in
personal injury cases, seem wholly inappropriate when the injury is only the loss of the value
of the purchaser's bargain." Id. at 549. The article goes on to say it would be ironic "if the
tort doctrine which was evolved to rescue the personal injury area from the 'intricacies of the
law of sales' were to imprison the economic loss area with inapposite tort concepts." Id.; see
also State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217-18 (Or. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Robert L. Rabin, Tort RecoveryNegligentlyInflictedEconomic
Loss, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1513 (1985).
5. William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of
Contract Over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 731 (1990).
6. The reason for that failure of communication may be a belief on the part of plaintiffs'
lawyers that the term of art, strict liability, embodies social realities so deep they are beyond
debate. Conversely, the defense lawyers' instinct is that once an issue is labeled as one of
"products liability" and "policy," the battle is lost.
1995]
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modem product law arrive at a conclusion that contract law has given way
to tort law and that the individual rule or precedent is no longer pertinent.
However, on closer examination, lawyers have not demonstrated a link
between premise and conclusion. Moreover, the attorney has not shown that
contract law is inadequate in theory, or that the commercial system is unfair
in its practical workings.
Those who defend the rule operate on a different intellectual dimension
than their adversaries. Typically, the defense does not challenge their
adversaries' assumptions that a change in the rule would advance the goals
of product liability. Rather they finesse, by praising contract doctrines as
the natural channel for business7 to provide the parties with an opportunity
to negotiate an arrangement to satisfy the needs of each.
This article tries to narrow the gap by recasting the case for the
economic loss rule in terms of the general concepts of products liability and
practical litigation.
II. THE AGENDA
Taking the classic "contract" defense of the economic loss rule as a
starting point, we attempt a more utilitarian and literal minded approach.
Our objective is to meet the concerns which lead others to call for change
head on. In the course of that effort, we urge the courts to prohibit strict
liability claims for pure economic injury, even when the potential plaintiff
is not a commercial entity. The economic loss rule, contract law, and the
commercial system have functioned sufficient enough to let people buy and
sell goods for hundreds of years. The working arrangements of everyday
life should not change because of a shift in fashion among tort and contract
theories.
7.
If the ultimate user were allowed to sue the manufacturer in negligence
merely because an article with latent defects turned out to be bad when used in
"regular service" without any accident occurring ... manufacturers would be
subject to indiscriminate lawsuits by persons having no contractual relations with
them, persons who could thereby escape the limitations, if any, agreed upon in
their contract of purchase. Damages for inferior quality, per se, should better
be left to suits between vendors and purchasers since they depend on the terms
of the bargain between them.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290 (1955).
Vol. 19
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Each suggestion rests on the following observations and contentions:
1) Those who criticize the rule should identify its specific problems
and explain why existing law cannot meet their needs. Often, statutory
reforms or traditional common law rulings, tailored to a specific need,
would solve the problem with minimum side effects. In contrast, a
sweeping pronouncement that tort law rather than contract law is to govern
an undefined group of cases will saddle the lower courts with practical,
doctrinal, and even constitutional problems.
2) A shift to tort liability will force manufacturing corporations to
take steps in self-protection. The ideal would be for those steps to improve
safety and to achieve other goals of product liability; however, there are
reasons to expect different results.
3) Trigger phrases such as "compensation," are important and valid
for their purpose-the identification of the goals of product liability.
However, they are neither specific nor objective enough to answer questions
at the heart of this debate. Plaintiffs' advocates propose a new system
which depends upon a vast increase in the number of tort lawsuits for
"economic loss." The court would be unable to determine whether that
approach would be as efficient as the existing system or whether it would
work at all.
4) The analysis of legal issues in terms of social needs and practical
impact is legitimate. But judges should decide whether a particular social
need exists rather than treat that central question as a background assump-
tion settled long ago in the academic literature. To the extent the argument
for reform takes on that routinized character, strict liability will expand
through momentum and stylishness rather than the reasoned analysis of new
circumstances.
III. AN OUTLINE OF LANDMARK CASES AND THE CLASSICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR THE OPPOSING POSITION
At an early stage in the development of modem product law, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the purchaser could sue in strict
liability for the value lost when a new rug developed a line which would not
"walk out."8 The broader teachings of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian9
emphasizes that the economic burden of injuries from products should be
8. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
9. Id.
1995]
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distributed throughout the system"° and that the law should make it easier
for the consumer-plaintiff to recover."
The California Supreme Court led the counterattack in Seely v. White
Motor Co. 2 If any jurist grasped both the significance and limitations of
the new concepts, it was the authors of the opinions in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc. " and Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.' 4 Neverthe-
less, Justice Traynor refused to apply strict liability to a claim for the failure
of a truck to operate properly. 5 Instead, he focused on the difference
between the risk to physical safety and the possibility that a product will not
meet the economic expectations of the buyer. 6 The former danger, he
wrote, is the logical province of the law of torts; the latter, the traditional
subject matter of contract and the law merchant. 7
Two decades later, in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc.,"8 the United States Supreme Court held there was no tort
claim where a turbine failed, impairing the ship's performance, but not
damaging the vessel itself or any other product. Specifically, Justice
Blackmun reasoned that: 1) a claim of that nature is best understood in
terms of warranty since the product did not meet the consumer's expecta-
10. The court was explicit on that point:
[W]hen the manufacturer presents his goods to the public for sale he accompa-
nies them with the representation that they are safe for the intended use.... The
obligation of the manufacturer thus becomes what in justice it ought to be-an
enterprise liability, and one which should not depend upon the intricacies of the
law of sales.
Id. at 311-12; see Patricia A. Brown & Jay M. Feinman, Economic Loss, Commercial
Practices, and Legal Process: Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford Motor Company, 22
Rutgers L.J. 301 (1991) (emphasizing different concepts of rational analysis).
11.
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damage,
either to the goods sold or to other property, resulting from defective products,
is borne by the makers of the products who put them in the channels of trade,
rather than by the injured or damaged person who ordinarily are [sic] powerless
to protect themselves.
Santor, 207 A.2d at 312; see also Parker, supra note 4, at 393 (discussing cases which
followed Santor).
12. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
13. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
14. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
15. Seely, 403 P.2d at 149.
16. Id.
17. Note that the Traynor opinion includes a thoughtful consideration of policy
questions; many of the authors' suggestions are elaborations on those themes. See id. at 145.
18. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
Vol. 19
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tions; 2) contract law is well suited to such commercial disputes because it
enables the parties to define their own agreement and their respective
obligations; and 3) warranty law has built-in boundaries and restraints,
whereas tort law may subject the defendant to limitless damages. 9
19. Id. at 871-74. East River has often been referred to as the "majority rule" in
products liability cases involving the economic loss issue. The Supreme Court of Alabama
adopted the East River rule in Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 543 So. 2d
671 (Ala. 1989), in which the court denied recovery to the lessee of a front-end loader that
caught fire and damaged itself. The court stated the "tort concern with safety is reduced
when an injury is only to the product itself' unlike the situation in which a "person is injured,
the 'cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune."'
Id. at 673 (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring)). The opinion urged
that consequential economic loss caused by the failure of the product is more easily and
readily insurable; that the parties should be free to allocate risks among themselves; and
finally, that warranty law contains an adequate remedy with necessary limitations on liability,
that is, privity and remoteness. Id. at 673-74. In his dissent, Justice Jones urged that the
majority view leaves the plaintiffs "remediless" when they do not suffer personal injury or
damage to the property (other than to the product itself). Id. at 674 (Jones, J., dissenting).
In his view, "to be relegated to commercial law (breach of warranty) for their remedy is to
be without a remedy." Id. (Jones, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Jones suggested that "[tjhe
manufacturer of standardized products either elects to warrant the product or not warrant the
product, it can limit both the quality and the quantity of that warranty as it sees fit." Lloyd,
543 So. 2d at 675 (Jones, J., dissenting). In contrast, he "never heard of the purchaser of a
piece of machinery having any input into either the nature or the extent of any warranty
given by the manufacture." Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
Justice Jones urged that:
The law should make no distinction between classes of plaintiffs whose injury
or loss results from a defective product... [and there] is no valid policy reason
for denying a cause of action in tort to those plaintiffs who, fortuitously, have
not suffered personal injury or property damage other than damage to the
defective product itself, but who.., are denied an action in contract because the
defective product is not covered by any form of extended warranty.
Id. (Jones, J., dissenting). This result should be compared to the Alabama Supreme Court's
opinion in Dairyland Insurance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 549 So. 2d 44 (Ala. 1989), in
which the court reversed the trial court's decision granting the defendant's summary judgment
on a negligence theory of liability. In Dairyland, a van caught fire while the plaintiff was
driving it. Although the plaintiff was not injured, the van was totally destroyed. In reversing
the negligence count, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the plaintiff set forth a "scintilla
of evidence" to satisfy the Alabama proof standard to show a defect in the van. Id. at 46.
The court applied Lloyd to bar the plaintiff's claims of negligent manufacture and extended
manufacturer liability, yet distinguished the decision from the plaintiff's negligent repair
theory wherein the plaintiff claimed he reported a problem with the van's lights to the
dealer's service personnel and staff did not follow normal procedures in response to such a
claim. Id.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania also adopted EastRiverin Rem Coal Co. v. Clark
Equipment Co., 563 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), in which the plaintiff company
1995]
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The New Jersey court returned to the issue in Spring Motors Distribu-
tors v. Ford Motor Co.2" The plaintiff, Spring Motors, was a corporation
in the business of selling and leasing trucks. Spring Motors purchased a
purchased a front-end loader from the defendant company to use in a strip mining business.
The plaintiff company sued the seller on a strict liability theory after the loader caught fire
and was severely damaged. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that contract law defined
the appropriate limits of recovery, regardless of the nature of the risk created by the
malfunction. Id. at 133.
Three years later, in Jones v. General Motors, 631 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), the
Pennsylvania Superior Court extended its holding in Rem Coal to cover situations in which
the plaintiff is an ordinary consumer, rather than a commercial enterprise. The plaintiff
purchased a new Chevrolet pick-up truck, which caught fire and was destroyed while parked
and empty. The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the defense. Id. at
665. The Third Circuit decision, Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981), referred to Rem Coal when the product defect alleged was the
lack of a fire suppression system on a front-end loader. The damage to the loader occurred
as a result of a sudden and calamitous fire. The Third Circuit qualified the defect as
dangerous, and held the plaintiff did have a tort cause of action for the event. Id. at 1174.
This conclusion was premised on the federal appellate court's prediction that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue, would adopt an intermediary position between
Seely and Santor. Id. A conclusion which would ban recovery for economic losses in
general, but allow for tort recovery when the product posed a risk of injury to the person or
other property of the plaintiff. Id. at 1168. In application, however, the Third Circuit held
the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action in tort because it only alleged a non-dangerous
defect and a gradual deterioration of the product, and neither involved a calamitous event.
Id. at 1174-75.
Ultimately, East River led the Third Circuit to reconsider. In Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark
Equipment Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987), the purchaser of
a front-end loader suedthe manufacturer in breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence
when the vehicle unexpectedly caught fire and suffered damage. No other property was
damaged, nor did any personal injury result from the incident. After reviewing East River,
the Third Circuit concluded the Supreme Court's analysis was so persuasive that it would be
followed by the Pennsylvania courts. Id. at 117. The court retreated from the intermediary
position it established in Pennsylvania Glass, and adopted the "bright-line" test enunciated
in East River. Id. In application, East River mandated the Third Circuit deny recovery in
tort, despite the calamitous nature of the event and the potentially dangerous nature of the
defect. Id. at 117. Similarly, in King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989), potato farmers sued in tort alleging the seed potatoes they
purchased were treated with Fusarex, a chemical manufactured by Hilton-Davis. The Third
Circuit reversed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1048. Referring to East
River as the majority rule, the Third Circuit determined that the distinctive issue of the
economic loss rule was whether the product "injures only itself." Id. at 1050. The court
concluded that the allegedly contaminated seed potatoes did not constitute "other property,"
hence, it was an instance involving only economic loss. Id. at 1051.
20. 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).
Vol. 19
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shipment of thirty Fords, opting for the transmissions the Clark Equipment
Company supplied, rather than standard Ford equipment. When Ford and
Clark Equipment were unable to eliminate malfunctions in the transmissions,
the dealer had to sell the trucks at a loss. A little more than four years after
the purchase, Spring Motors filed suit against Ford and Clark Equipment for
breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence. The trial court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that all claims were barred by the U.C.C.'s four
year statute of limitations. On appeal, the appellate division held that the
six year statute of limitations for tort actions applied rather than the shorter
warranty limit. After surveying New Jersey opinions on strict liability, the
intermediate appellate court concluded the extension of strict liability to
economic loss would be consistent with that development.2'
The defendants did not cross-appeal. Accordingly, the issue before the
New Jersey Supreme Court was whether a commercial buyer of defective
goods is limited to U.C.C. remedies and is prevented from asserting claims
in strict liability and negligence.22
In the majority opinion, Justice Pollock did not retreat from the Santor
rule insofar as a future case might involve a consumer purchaser.23 The
court held, nevertheless, that the U.C.C. governed the sale of a fleet of
trucks to Spring Motors, a large dealership, and its reasoning left no doubt
that the result should be the same in any litigation arising from a transaction
between commercial parties which results in purely economic loss. 24 In his
21. Id. at 663.
22. Id. at 662.
23. The majority opinion in SpringMotors concluded the lack of privity would not have
barred the warranty action. See id. The concurring opinion expresses concern regarding the
effect the majority's reasoning in a case which did not arise from such a clearly commercial
relationship. Id. at 677 (Handler, J., concurring). Each is consistent with an argument that
the result should be the opposite in a pure "consumer" case.
24. Justice Pollock observed the U.C.C. "constitutes a comprehensive system for
determining the rights and duties of buyers and sellers with respect to contracts for the sale
of goods." Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 665. He emphasized strict liability traditionally
applied to product defects which cause physical injury, but in this case there was a lack of
privity between the consumer and the manufacturer of the defective product. Id. at 674. The
U.C.C. is designed to simplify disputes between business entities. Id. On that basis, the
court concluded commercial parties which suffer economic losses because of defective goods
are limited to their rights and remedies under the U.C.C., and may not resort to tort theories
such as strict liability and negligence. Id.
The majority opinion further stated that the delineation of the boundary between strict
liability and the U.C.C. requires appreciation not only of the policy considerations
underscoring both sets of principles, but also of the role of the legislature as a coordinate
branch of government. Id. By enacting the U.C.C., Congress adopted a carefully conceived
1995]
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concurring opinion, Justice Handler approved the result in this instance,
specifically because the parties maintained a long-standing commercial
relationship, and it would be natural to expect the U.C.C. to govern.
Nevertheless, he expressed concern that there would not always be such a
clear-cut distinction between a commercial buyer and a "consumer," and that
there will be instances of unequal bargaining power,25 even though each
participant is a commercial entity.
Our brief synopses would do an injustice if they suggested the courts
ignored the policy dimension of the issue.26 Yet even in the landmark
decisions, the common ground fades into generalization and stylized
abstraction. Those seeking to change the rule speak of steps to equalize
bargaining power, but investigate neither the extent of the disparity of
bargaining power nor the effects of the change. Those who would support
the rule show a sturdy faith in bargaining, but say little of the numerous
instances in which there was no bargaining and never could have been.
IV. HARDER QUESTIONS FOR THE DEFENSE AND SOME ANSWERS
The classic defense of the economic loss rule draws intellectual force
from a faith that individuals and corporations know their own needs and that
bargaining between them is an efficient method for the allocation of risks
system of rights and remedies to govern commercial transactions. Spring Motors, 489 A.2d
at 674. Allowing Spring Motors to recover from Ford under tort principles would dislocate
major provisions of the U.C.C. Id. For example, application of tort principles would obviate
the statutory requirement that a buyer give notice of a breach of warranty, and would deprive
the seller of the ability to exclude or limit its liability. In sum, the U.C.C. represents a
comprehensive statutory scheme satisfying the needs of the world of commerce, and courts
should pause before developing judicial doctrines that might dislocate the legislative structure.
25. The examples Justice Handler used included sales of such vehicles to:
a travelling salesperson or a small-scale trucker, or a carpenter, plumber,
electrician, or landscape gardener. It does not follow automatically that if the
vehicle proves to be defective, the U.C.C. shall apply as the exclusive remedy
to govern recovery of direct or consequential economic loss solely because such
purchaser is in business or bought the vehicle for use in business. Rather, the
analysis should turn on whether a purchase made in that kind of setting, even if
for a business or commercial purpose, is sufficiently distinguishable from a
purchase for personal use by an ordinary private consumer to justify a difference
in remedial treatment.
Id. at 679. Justice Handler went on to discuss the possibility that the remote buyer might not
be able to benefit by the abolition of vertical privity if he did not receive notice of the manu-
facturer's disclaimer of liability. Id. at 680-81.
26. Spring Motors, in particular, represents a direct and conscientious evaluation of
policy considerations. See id. at 671.
Vol. 19
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/4
O'Donnell / Weiss / Kaplan
and burdens.27 Plaintiffs respond, however, that the reasoning grows
hollow when a corporation is pitted against one who does not have the
sophistication or even the opportunity to negotiate.28
At the least, the critics of the rule are correct that the purchaser gets no
opportunity to bargain with the intermediate sellers, even those who played
vital roles in the process that led to the complete product.29 The answer,
for the most part, must be that which the Supreme Court suggested in East
River: harshness in some individual cases is the price for a stable commer-
cial system.
Finding the defense of the majority view not completely satisfactory
ourselves, we take consolation in exploring the countervailing unrealities of
some arguments against the rule.
A. The Lure of Oversimplification
In Santor, Justice Francis indicated that the manufacturer's responsibili-
ty should be the same whether the damage is to a person or to a rug-one
injury is like another if each is the consequence of a defect in a product.3"
The assertion was epigrammatic and forceful. But symmetry in doctrine
bumps against reality. Personal injury and economic losses are not the same
thing in ordinary speech, in practical effect, or in legal analysis.3 The
27. For example, in Spring Motors the court held when the action is between
"commercial parties with comparable bargaining power," neither strict products liability nor
negligence may be used as a basis for recovering "benefit of the bargain" or consequential
loss damages. Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 670-71. The disappointed commercial entity will
be left to its remedies, if any, under the U.C.C. Id. at 674; see also Scandinavian Airlines
Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1979).
28. For a recent case following the majority position on the economic loss rule, but
distinguishing it on policy grounds, see Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex, 493 N.W.2d 513
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992), in which the parties did not have an opportunity to negotiate because
even though the defect in the product existed from the outset, it was unknown. Celotex held
that asbestos is unique in the law, and determined the risk was not the type to be allocated
to the parties to the negotiation process. Id. at 518-19.
29. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248 (Barkett, J., dissenting). There are a number of
cases which take opposing stands as to whether the economic loss rule applies when the
parties are not in privity. See Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, 772 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th
Cir. 1985); Hap's Aerial Enter. v. General Aviation Corp., 496 N.W.2d 680, 681-82 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1992). These cases raise the point that the rule is appropriate only when there is
a commercial relationship.
30. Santor, 207 A.2d at 309.
31. But see Rabin, supra note 4, at 1513-15 (arguing the opposing view).
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distinctions between them are in fact central to modem products liability
doctrine.
One difference lies in the demands each makes on the trial courts.
Commercial cases involve numerous parties in a variety of relationships.
Personal injury cases are often fearfully complex for other reasons.
Nonetheless, they present more concentrated and manageable fact issues in
the sense that the injury victims generally suffer harm of a single type. In
the more significant of these cases such as design litigation, a decision for-
or against-one claimant on the liability issue would require the same
conclusion as to the others.32
More important holdings, such as Greenman, arose from the human
experience that the economic consequences of major personal injuries tend
to devastate the individual in a way that others do not.33
32. A commentator suggests the reason why recovery is permitted for personal injury
is:
[U]n personal injury situations such as the airplane crash and building collapse,
the injury victims constitute a single class-they suffer a type of harm in
common. Barring recovery for any individual victim would mean barring the
recovery for all victims. Putting aside the accountants' liability cases, incidents
involving widespread economic loss are quite different from the cases of
multiple personal injury. The chain of commercial losses triggered by the
accidental closure of a plant or death of a person are "ripple effect" losses; in
an important sense they implicate a secondary group of victims who suffer
highly diverse types of harm.
Rabin, supra note 4, at 1533.
33. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 897. The response might be that there are many economic
catastrophes which are also devastating to human victims, but that question is beyond the
scope of this paper. For better or for worse, the view that personal injury damages are
unique seems established.
Other differences between economic loss and personal injury involve the fact that
economic loss is easily quantified in advance, and thus is easily insurable. See Lloyd, 543
So. 2d at 673 (holding defendant was not strictly liable for having sold front-end loader that
caught fire and damaged itself). Damages which may be quantified in advance of the
transaction are most efficiently handled as part of the bargain, rather than by time-consuming
and expensive litigation after the fact.
Even in the case of defective automobiles-the classic situation enabling tort recovery
for buyers-courts draw a clear distinction between economic losses and personal injuries.
For example, in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989 (Colo. 1975), the court
refused to invoke strict liability to cover lost profits resulting from a defect in a truck
purchased for business use.
Lost profit is clearly more "economic" than other types of loss which have formed the
basis for strict liability claims. However, the rationale distinguishing lost profit claims from
personal injury claims applies equally as well to other claims for economic loss damages.
See, e.g., Prairie Prod., Inc. v. Agchem Div. Pennwalt Corp., 514N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. Ct. App.
Vol. 19
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B. Wolves in Sheep's Clothing
Another observation is equally impressionistic, yet it has both a
pedigree and a moral. Critics urge that the doctrine protects sellers at the
expense of "consumers"--a value-charged phrase. But a closer look at an
opinion which expresses that concern often reveals that it is a business,
rather than a "hapless consumer" which pushes to change the economic loss
rule.34
In Seely, for instance, Justice Traynor observed that the complaint of
overreaching by the seller had little force because the plaintiff itself was a
corporation.3" The working hypothesis drawn is that companies often
struggle to cut back the rule and that they act rationally when they do so.
The benefits of the change would flow to them as much as to individuals.
Corporations, after all, are buyers as often as sellers. Equally important,
they have the resources and institutional attention span to take full advantage
of the change. An argument that the rule protects corporations against
individuals requires a closer and more skeptical scrutiny.
The buyer who is not a corporation is not necessarily so poor or
unsophisticated as the sacred texts of products liability suggest. In Casa
Clara, for example, one of the individual claimants bought his own land and
hired a general contractor and architect.36 Rather being a contract of
1987) (denying recovery of lost profits to farmer who purchased pesticide that failed to
eliminate corn earworms, thus, deferring to legislative framework setforth in U.C.C.); Brown
v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 521 P.2d 537 (Or. 1974) (rejecting lost profit as basis for recovery
when farmer was unable to sell chickens that ate defective feed supplied by defendant); Star
Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982) (refusing to extend
strict liability recovery of lost profits for plaintiff who purchased defective clock). But see
Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1978) (allowing recovery
of lost profits under maritime negligence law by fishermen who purchased defective- boats);
Cooley v. Big Hom Harvestore Sys., Inc., 767 P.2d 740 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 813 P.2d 763 (1991) (allowing recovery on negligence theory to dairy farmers
who lost profits because grain storage system failed to prevent spoilage); Chubb Group Ins.
Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding plaintiff
entertainment companies could recover lost profits from collapse of arena built by
defendants).
34. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio
1979) (holding in favor of large corporation that successfully relied on precedent emphasizing
the plight of individual); American Drugstores v. AT&T Technologies, 583 N.E.2d 694 (I11.
2d App. Ct. 1991) (refusing to extend strict liability when several businesses sued telephone
company after fire at switching station disrupted telephone service in community because no
one sustained any injury or property damage).
35. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151-52.
36. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1249.
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adhesion, the agreement gave him the right to attorneys' fees in the event
of the seller's breach.37
Even a more representative individual buyer need not be a victim per
se. The argument against the rule frequently includes the assertion that an
ordinary person is overwhelmed by contracts and fine print. Yet people
cope with contracts every day; the generality is overbroad and even
patronizing. True, some transactions are difficult. The purchase of a home,
for example, is the largest investment the ordinary person ever makes.3"
Everyone knows that, and as a result, buying a house is the occasion in a
lifetime when the ordinary person is most likely to hire a lawyer to represent
his or her interests.39 The lawyer, moreover, can do that work at an
acceptable cost; this is customary in nature and the issues are well settled.
If the courts open the way to novel tort-based claims, that predictability
would diminish. What would this change bring the public in return?
V. THE LACK OF A SINGLE, COMPELLING OBJECTIVE
Although the debate is one of the great pieces of products liability lore,
it still is unclear what the advocates of change strive to accomplish.4" One
answer, implicit in the complaints of unequal bargaining power, is they
think the change would make the process of negotiation and compromise
more equitable.
Even if given the chance, would the ordinary consumer dicker with
dozens of suppliers over the prices and specifications of engine blocks, seat
springs, shatterproof glass, and hundreds of other individual components
rather than buy a complete automobile?4 To the extent the buyer would
not do such a thing, the case for dismantling the commercial system to cure
the supposed lack of opportunity grows more dubious.
Any initial impression of unfairness fades even more when one
considers the buyer has enforceable rights against the seller of a house or of
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1247 (citing Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983)).
39. Id.
40. In the individual case, of course, the change could lead to a plaintiff's victory, but
that is not a coherent intellectual basis for broad change.
41. In theory, if the buyer had an opportunity to bargain, the buyer could demand a
written extension of warranty from the supplier of each component. The common sense
response is that the possibility of product failure of one of the components sometime in the
future is not enough to justify all the paperwork. However, the same possibility could not
justify adding new complexities to lawsuits and imposing new burdens on the courts.
Vol. 19
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any other product.42 Further, the seller almost always was the buyer of
components at a preceding stage.43 To survive, it had to remember that its
own customer might complain and even sue if any component should fail.
This put pressure on the business to search for good materials and to bargain
for warranty coverage, for the consumer's ultimate benefit." This indirect
42. See, e.g., Hartley v. Ballou, 209 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. 1974) (extending implied
warranty recovery against builder of house that flooded during rainy weather); George v.
Veach, 313 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing recovery for breach of implied
warranty by buyer of house with failed septic system against builder of house).
Recovery under implied warranty in the context of a builder's liability is traceable to
the 1884 United States Supreme Court decision, Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S.
108 (1884). In Kellogg, the Court allowed recovery by a railroad company against the
company it hired to build a bridge when the temporary supports of the bridge collapsed
becausethe bridge company breached the implied warranty that the temporary supports would
be reasonably suitable for the use contemplated by both parties. Id. at 118-19.
43. It is true, of course, that the intermediaries hope to keep the benefit of the bargain
for themselves rather than pass it on to the purchaser of home. However, that question is the
subject ofthe negotiations between "homeowners" and "developers" over price, warranty, and
quality.
44. For example, the court may find that an oversight by the maker of a product led to
a defect and the failure of a product, the maker exercised a level of prudence that precluded
any claim under implied warranty, even for the initial purchaser. See, e.g., City of Mounds
View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978) (refusing recovery under implied
warranty against architect when plaintiff's building suffered from water seepage despite fact
that builders followed architect's plans because the "inescapable possibility of error which
inheres in [architectural] services"). But see Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 151 So. 2d 767
(Ala. 1963) (holding defendant civil engineering company liable under implied warranty for
occasional failure of drainage system despite lack of evidence of negligence).
Recovery may also be precluded in situations which neither buyer nor seller could have
reasonably foreseen the defect in the subject of the transaction. Compare Witty v. Schramm,
379 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. 3d App. Ct. 1978) (refusing to imply warranty that no subsurface waters
would be present in unimproved building lots and noting neither party had superior
knowledge as to existence of subsurface waters) with Jordan v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174
(Ind. 4th Ct. App. 1989) (allowing recovery under implied warranty for buyer of building lot
who found property was in natural water course, and was therefore worthless even though
seller carried out significant improvements on property, was a professional real estate
developer, was in best position to forego development of the lot and knew of the existence
of the natural water course).
When a subsequent purchaser, not in privity with the maker or initial seller, seeks to
recover damages caused by a defect in the product courts may bar recovery unless the
subsequent purchaser is endangered in a way that was foreseeable to the initial seller.
Compare Huang v. Garner, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1st Ct. App. 1984) (allowing recovery under
negligence theory by subsequent purchaser of apartment building built by defendant) with
Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc., 745 P.2d 1284 (Wash. 1987) (refusing
recovery from builder under implied warranty to owners of condominium who had no direct
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protection for later purchasers is neither absolute nor inevitably sufficient.
Its existence, however, calls for rebuttal from the proponents of change.
VI. SOME COSTS OF REFORM
A. The Uncertainties in the New Body of Law
Those who would change the rule speak as if tort theory were a fully
developed body of law which the courts could transplant to the new factual
matrix with little difficulty. The reality is different.
Products liability only recently became a significant branch of the
law,45 and vital doctrinal questions are still unsettled.46 Consider the de-
cades of wrangling over the meaning of "defect" and the extent to which
recent proposals for the revision of section 402(a) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts have fanned the flames. 7 In addition, there are disputes
as to how the jury should be instructed.
dealings with builder because the defects did not cause a violent occurrence).
45. David G. Owen, A Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of
Liability and Defense of Product Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769 (1977).
The seminal cases that spearheaded the modem development ofproducts liability
law were decided in 1960 and 1963. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The predominant treatise on
products liability, L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY (1976),
was first published in 1960, and the first edition of the other treatise in the field,
R. HURSH (now with H. BAILEY), AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d
ed. 1974), was published one year later. The first Canadian text, S. WADDAMS,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, was published in 1974, and the first English text has just
been published, C.J. MILLER & P. LOVELL, PRODUCT LIABILITY (Butterworths
1977).
Id. at 771 n.18.
46. RICHARD A. EPsTErN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 69 (1980). Professor
Epstein demonstrated design liability embraces fundamentally different categories, and
currently the law has not created a rigorous standard for the complex, important cases. Id.
Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 438 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1993), is an example of the
fluid and unsettled nature of the products liability doctrine. In Johnson, claims arising from
a head-on collision required the state court to touch on the complexities of"crashworthiness:"
the doctrine and the burden of proof in that context; the relationship between one view of the
burden and the legislation governing the offsets of settlements; the collateral source rule; the
distinction between a defendant's position under a duty to warn based on strict liability and
one based on negligence; the "two issue rule;" and other matters. Id. at 33-42.
47. Alvin S. Weinstein et al., Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology,
12 DUQ. L. REV. 425, 431 (1974).
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The meaning or effect of some concepts vary in the different context
of tort and contract law. Nothing might seem more familiar or indisputable
than the manufacturer's ability to comprehend the nature of the product's
probable performance better than the consumer who happens to be hurt in
an accident. When the product does not cause physical harm, however, the
balance of advantage is the mirror image of those personal injury cases in
which strict liability took shape. Now it is the buyer who knows where the
product will be used and whether it must act in conjunction with other
devices or components. The manufacturer or intermediate seller may not
know those things; at best, its information comes from the buyer. As a
result, the seller has no greater chance to predict the severity of the damage
than the buyer.4 In fact, quite often the seller has less of a chance.49
The change would also burden routine sales with the tort concept of the
duty to warn. The impact of that departure would be magnified by the
judicial temptation to object to virtually any label or instruction provided for
a jury review." All this clashes with the contractual allocation of risk."'
Further, those new claims will overlap the warranty rights which purchasers
already have.
On a more practical level, if lawyers analyze economic loss cases
through the prism of tort theory, they will be encouraged to try them like
tort cases. Yet it would not add to the efficiency of commercial life to
import more of the theatrics of personal injury litigation. 2 For example,
the plaintiff's tactical reason for pleading tort rather than contract might be
to lay the groundwork for a punitive damage count. That, in turn, would
bring greater uncertainty as to whether jurors will respond to attacks on the
character and morality of the defendant.
48. James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512 (1992).
49. Id.
50. It is true that sophisticated buyers often give the seller specific requirements for
products, but that is an example of bargaining, the subject of contract law.
51. Courts have recognized that a buyer may consider a "defective" product to be a good
bargain if the defect is apparent and reflected in the price. Holding the seller strictly liable
in these situations would make these transactions unavailable to consumers and reduce the
value of products with patent defects below their true market value. See Aronsohn v.
Mandara, 484 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1984) (denying buyer of house recovery for defects
discoverable upon reasonable inspection, which should have been reflected in price paid);
Meadowbrook Condominium Ass'n v. Southern Burlington Realty Corp., 565 A.2d 238 (Vt.
1989) (denying recovery under implied warranty to condominium purchasers, who
presumably paid less for their units acquired after defects in common areas became apparent).
52. See EPSTEIN, supra note 46, at 107 (discussing the lack of unlimited boundaries to
liability and the extent to which the duty to warn is also in the midst of development).
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B. The Burden at the Working Level
These difficulties are not academic curiosities. If the economic loss
rule was abolished, trial judges would have to revisit settled issues of
contract law in light of tort principles. 3 The proposal, after all, is to set
up a new universe of precedent. This must be parallel to contract law, but
sufficiently distinct from the cases to produce different results in significant
cases. Otherwise, there would be no point. Further, the promise of change
gives the plaintiffs lawyer a professional duty to contest what once
appeared clear.
In turn, those who manufacture and sell goods must foresee the answers
courts would give to those questions. Indeed, in many instances the
boundaries of the manufacturer's risk would be set by the subjective
"expectations" of the purchaser as his or her lawyer chooses to reconstruct
them long after the sale. This necessarily reduces the predictability and
utility of limitations on warranty or waivers.
Equally important is the fact that producers would have to guess
whether another court might decide that a buyer,54 or anyone to whom that
buyer might resell55 the product, lacked "bargaining power., 56  This
53. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (illustrating the possible
dangers judges might face, although the Pennzoil-Texaco situation arose from a different tort
theory).
54. Rabin, supra note 4, at 1536.
When the ripple effects characteristic of widespread economic loss are
involved-that is, the disruption of a heterogenous conglomeration of commer-
cial and financial relationships occur-the prospect of reasonable foresight is
especially attenuated.
Whether this point is equally applicable to the more modest case of
widespread economic loss in which physical harm to a particular individual-the
running down of a pedestrian, for example-triggers a variety of collateral
financial losses, ranging from the victim's boss to his barber, is a closer
question. In this situation, however, the relatively weak deterrence claim is
arguably outweighed by the ethical objection to extended liability for a careless
act.
Moreover, because potentially widespread loss is often either uninsurable
or very expensive to insure against, the superior risk-spreading capability of
defendants, whether commercial or individual, is open to serious doubt.
Id. at 1536-38.
55. Or anyone else to whom the product might pass later.
56. Variations and asymmetry often exist in individual sales transactions "upstream" and
"downstream" from the manufacturer. Contractual bargains up and down the line of
production and distribution would be affected by application of a tort theory of liability for
the failure of the product to live up to the expectations of the purchaser. Should all suppliers
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problem would not be limited to large corporate vendors. Small companies
would have the same risk even when they dealt with relatively wealthy
individuals.
The "horrible" does not always materialize and in fact cases such as
Greenman and Henningsen did not disrupt commerce." The reason,
however, is not that the danger was imaginary, but that the judges who
developed products liability doctrine recognized that tinkering is justified
only when the disparity in bargaining power is glaring." Those who
would do away with the economic loss rule have not defined the potential
consequences their proposals.
Arguments stating that a change from contract to tort would simplify
and rationalize the legal system have vigor and simplicity. But that
impression fades upon closer inspection. The supposed reform would
actually complicate the liability analysis in some cases.
The distinctions of the principles between strict liability and contractual
liability, which is seldom clear in product disputes, grow more blurry when
the economic loss case arises from a claim of design defect.59 Potential
plaintiffs urge that the jury should balance the risk, the costs, and the utility
to indicate whether there is a defect. While consumers strike that balance
when they decide whether to buy a product or not, jurors could not make
more precise judgments after the fact. There also would be a question as
to how the jury's finding of a "contract breach" differs from a finding of a
defect in an instance where there is no formal agreement.
To be sure, there are important differences between the two bodies of
doctrine. However, "different" is not necessarily "better."
of raw materials, contractors, distributors, etc., obtain insurance against liability, limitless in
amount, scope, and time? Balancing of the kind required in sales transactions is the function
of the U.C.C. and the law of sales, which provide a flexible means by which to measure the
proper expectations of all of the parties.
57. Even though it is simpler and less time consuming, classification by category might
be inaccurate in many instances. Putting aside the question of fairness, the alternative would
be a time consuming, case by case determination of the relative buying powers of the parties.
More sophisticated academic writing calls for the analysis of the relationship between the
plaintiffs and a determination as to whether or not commercial results will govern. The
argument is logical, but as one of its proponent's put it, it would require sophisticated
analysis of a variety of cases at the trial level, thus it would be impractical.
58. However, many would argue that those legal developments have had adverse
marginal effects on cost and efficiency.
59. See Brown & Feinman, supra note 10, at 341. Only a very significant difference
between the parties' risk-bearing abilities is relevant to the court in its determination of who
is the superior risk bearer. Id.
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VII. THE UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHO WOULD GAIN,
How, AND WHY
The tort statute of limitations is often shorter than that for contract
claims. In addition, the tort action may not survive the death of a party.6"
Notions of causation are less restrictive in tort law than in contract law6
and "foreseeability," already an amorphous concept in contract doctrine, is
still less defined in tort law.62
Finally, tort damage principles are often looser than contract damage
principles. Contract law gives the claimant the benefit of the bargain rather
than compensation for loss.63 Each of the established contract principles
developed as courts examined a variety of cases and refined their responses
to realities. One of the resulting contract doctrines may be error; all may
be mere historical artifacts. Yet before a court accepts either suggestion, it
should ask more specific justification for dismantling a system which has
evolved over centuries and which permits the doing of the world's work, no
matter how imperfectly.
A. The Purchaser Without Tears
Plaintiffs tend to speak as if there was a consensus that the change
would help consumers or buyers as a class, and that this is a public benefit
so great that compels the abolition of the economic loss rule."
The premise, beguiling so long as its not closely examined, is that a
change in the law is desirable if it would make it easier for consumers, or
special subcategories of that broad class, to recover for a particular
60. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 655 (5th ed. 1984).
61. Similarly, immunities such as those of municipal corporations or charities may bar
tort claims, but not contract claims.
62. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS §§ 42, 92 (4th ed. 1971).
63. East River, 476 U.S. at 873-74 n.9.
64. Dean Prosser suggests the tort remedy is often more advantageous to the injured
party because it permits the recovery of larger damages, beyond the prototypical limitations
of Hadley v. Baxendale. KEETON, supra note 60, § 9.2, at 665 (citing Hadley v. Baxendale,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)). A tort action may also allow recovery for wrongful death
whereas, a contract action would not. See East River, 476 U.S. at 874 (placing great
emphasis on the distinction between tort and contract).
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injury.6 The threshold question is whether it should be easier for the
buyer to prevail under the particular circumstances. 6
It is debatable whether plaintiffs, as a class, need more help. Newly
created implied warranties, condominium legislation and other specialized
statutes already have made the balance more favorable for particular
groups.67 A "reform," giving them additional bargaining power, would
help some individual members of those classes win more lawsuits, but it will
not always be the plaintiff who gains from the change. For example, to
demand proof that the other side was guilty of negligence could make
recovery more difficult for some claimants. More generally, traditional
warranty law, the U.C.C., and specialized reform statutes, such as lemon
laws, provide significant protection for the broad class of "purchasers." '
If some need more, the next question is whether the abolition of the
economic loss rule is the best way for the courts to help them. Assuredly,
there are other paths. Even when codified, general contract and warranty
doctrines are flexible enough to allow a court to do justice in the exceptional
case. A judge can refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract,69 or more
specifically, an agreement in which waivers or limitations of liability are so
extreme that the remaining remedy fails its essential purpose.7"
On the other hand, the abolition of the economic loss rule might not
make a significant difference to most individuals, or even to a company
which has a small claim. In practice, if not in theory, a dispute which
involves only property damage at the consumer level cannot often generate
65. The plaintiff's lawyer urging the change in particular cases know what they are
doing. Clients would win the individual matters, but that is not enough to justify judicial
action.
66. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 1982).
67. That poirnt may seem too obvious to be interesting. Nevertheless, even some
academic writing seems t6 come dangerously close to saying requirements of proof should
be abolished for no reason other than they work to the disadvantage of plaintiff. See Gerald
F. Teitz et al., Crashworthiness and Erie: Determining State Law Regarding the Burden of
ProvinganddpportioningDamages, 62 TEMP. L.Q. 587, 621 n.21 (1989) (criticizing Huddell
requirements of proof in "second collision" or "crashworthiness" case because, as long as
they remain in force, plaintiff would have to base his or her claim on "speculation or
conjecture or both" in instances where an expert can say the design caused the particular
harm).
68. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247.
69. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 (express warranty), 2-314 (implied warranty for merchant-
ability), 2-315 (warranty of fitness for a particular purpose) (1994); JAMES L. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 406 (2d ed. 1980).
70. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1994). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 69
(discussing related doctrines and remedies).
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a contingent fee attractive to the specialized plaintiffs' bar. However, it
seems reasonable to expect that most of these cases will be handled as they
always have been, by a neighborhood lawyer or the associate who takes his
wife's uncle's case in the hope that it will lead to greater things. A typical
trial will be a matter of a half-day in a county court, not a venue in which
a lawyer often could explore the nuances and complexities of strict
liability.
71
The differences will matter, of course, in other cases. Strict liability
is more likely to occur in those instances where the litigants have large
amounts at stake and have bargained over difficulties which each side
foresaw. That brings us full circle to Seely and the classical insight that
such disputes are the meat and drink of contract law.
VIII. THE FALSE PROMISE OF EXCEPTIONS AND DISTINCTIONS
A. Assumed Boundaries and Their Life Expectancy
Insofar as the objective is to shield the individual buyer, the answer
might be to preserve the economic loss rule for disputes between corpora-
tions or commercial enterprises, but to abolish the doctrine where the
plaintiff is an individual. That, however, would mean one rule for
businesses and another for those who buy products from these businesses.72
The equilibrium could not be stable.
It is the nature of a sales controversy to drag commercial enterprises
into what began as simple disputes between private persons or small
businesses. For example, when an individual plaintiff obtains a tort verdict
against a supplier, builder, or manufacturer, the defendant will usually
demand contribution or indemnity from the corporate suppliers further back
71. For an example of a case discussing the complexities of strict liability see Spring
Motors, 465 A.2d at 530. The essential argument before the Superior Court of New Jersey
was that the extension of strict liability would clash with the statutory scheme and was not
supported by the policies which underlie strict liability or the weight of authority. Id. at 533.
72. Courts more readily apply the economic loss rule in cases in which the plaintiff and
defendant are both sophisticated commercial enterprises. Compare Public Serv. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1281 (D.N.H. 1988) (denying tort recovery to
plaintiff company, which sustained losses when steam turbine generator purchased from
defendant company malfunctioned) and Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 775 P.2d
741 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 772 P.2d 884 (N.M. 1989) (denying tort recovery to
plaintiff company who purchased from defendant company a coal hauling machine which
caught fire) with McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 646 F. Supp. 1520 (D.N.J. 1986)
(extending tort recovery for economic losses to plaintiff fisherman who purchased boat engine
from defendant company).
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in the chain of distribution. A comparable dynamic requires that lawyers
adapt to the arguments first inspired by the plight of the individual to the
needs of ever-larger clients. The cry, in fact, already has gone up that small
business also lacks bargaining power.73
IX. SOME DRAWBACKS TO THE "CATASTROPHIC RISK" AND
"SEPARATE PRODUCT" EXCEPTIONS
A court may be more receptive to incremental adjustments in the
economic loss rule than to a revolutionary change. Problems still lurk
beneath the surface. The boundaries of the rule are murky74 and they will
grow less settled if each case is to require the analysis of the consequences
which might have come to pass. The ordeal could become a perpetual
motion machine, given the impact of the related argument that there should
be tort recovery where a product failure is "violent" or likely to create "risks
to personal safety."
Plaintiffs struggle to equate their cases to conventional tort claims,
crying out against injuries that would have occurred if the product had failed
in a different way, and possibly killing or maiming someone. At times, this
is only lawyerly melodrama.75
Most product failures can be characterized as involving at least a
"potential" danger to human life if the plaintiff's attorney has even modest
theatrical talent.76 That is not a practical limitation on liability, nor one
73. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248 (Barkett, J., dissenting); see also Spring Motors,
489 A.2d at 677 (Handler, J., concurring) (stating it would not be long before plaintiffs'
advocates begin to tell trial courts one company concealed information, and as a result, the
other suffered because of its "relative" lack of bargaining power).
74. East River, 476 U.S. at 875.
75. In Bellevue South Associates v. HRH Construction Corp., 574 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170
(1991), the Court of Appeals of New York denied recovery in strict products liability for the
replacement of a defective floor in residential apartments. The court found no reason to
adopt the East River rule because the plaintiff failed to meet even a less restrictive test. Id.
The evidence did not show damage to persons or other property or even risk of such injury
from the defective tiles. Id. Thus, they were not an inherently dangerous product and the
specific failure, delamination of the tiles, was not considered an abrupt, cataclysmic event.
Id.; see Norman L. Greene, Away from Ideology: A Review of Product Liability Defenses
in the Era of Tort Reform, 13 PACE L. REv. 43, 75 (1993).
76. In Casa Clara, lower grade concrete the buyer purchased led to "spalling," cracking,
and staining. It was not unreasonable to extrapolate a situation whereby homeowners found
their roofs falling, subjecting innocent people to broken bones, if not death, and as a result,
shattering families. The fact that injuries did not actually occur did not make the accounts
less blood curdling. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247.
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In Kodiak Electric Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984), the plaintiff
electric company sued the maker of a generator that failed, leading to an overload that caused
another to fail, and in turn caused an electrical fire. The plaintiff argued that, since it was
customary for two workers to go near the unit that caught fire, and since-had they been near
it at the time of the fire-they could have been injured, the failure was dangerous, and should
trigger tort liability. Id. at 153. The Alaskan Supreme Court accepted the argument on the
basis of the potential danger to persons. Id. at 154. This result is consistent with the
Alaskan Supreme Court decision in Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983).
Wagner, the general contractor, insulated the plaintiff's building with urea formaldehyde
foam insulation ("Insulspray"). Id. at 457. The plaintiffs moved into the building, but
months later found the Insulspray gave off noxious and malodorous fumes causing allergic
reactions and creating a health hazard. Id. The plaintiff accused Wagner of negligently
installing the insulation, and sought relief because the fumes drove customers away, reducing
the value of the building to almost nothing. Id. The court permitted the tort claims, holding
the plaintiffs' stated a claim upon which relief may be granted under the theories of both
implied warranty and strict liability. Shooshanian, 672 P.2d at 462-64. The court reached
its decision by contrasting Shooshanian with an earlier opinion, Morrow v. New Moon
Homes. Id. at 462-64 (citing Morrow, 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976)). In Morrow, the
plaintiffs sued in tort, alleging the mobile home they purchased had a leaky roof, ill-fitting
windows and doors, a noisy furnace, and other features that made the mobile home so poor
a bargain that they should not pay. Morrow, 548 P.2d at 281-82. The Shooshanian court
contrasted the "poor product" allegation of Morrow with the claim in the instant case because
the use of the allegedly toxic substance in the building physically altered the structure in a
manner rendering it harmful to the plaintiffs. Shooshanian, 672 P.2d at 464.
Perhaps, more insightful is the Alaskan Supreme Court's decision Cloud v. Kit
Manufacturing Co., 563 P.2d 248, 249 (Alaska 1977), in which dissatisfied mobile home
purchasers sued, alleging the polyurethane foam rug padding provided to them as part of the
mobile home package ignited, and caused the trailer to catch fire. The Alaskan Supreme
Court held the resulting injury constituted "property damage" rather than unrecoverable
"economic loss," even though the line between the two is "not always easy to discern,
particularly when the plaintiff is seeking compensation for loss of the product itself." Id. at
251. The court stated that it could not "lay down an all inclusive rule to distinguish between
the two categories; however.., sudden and calamitous damage will almost always result in
direct property damage and that deterioration, internal breakage and depreciation will be
considered economic loss." Id. (citing Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966) [hereinafter Economic Loss]). The court
provided, as an example, a scenario in which a "defective radiator causes property damage
when it results in a fire which destroys the plaintiff's store and causes economic harm
because the resulting conditions are so uncomfortable it causes the loss of customer
patronage." Cloud, 563 P.2d at 251 n.8 (citing Economic Loss, supra, at 918); cf. Northern
Power Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981) (categorizing
failure of defective oil pressure "shutdown" mechanism that caused engine to stop working
as entirely economic loss since other property was not damaged).
The result in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1976), is antithetical
to the East River doctrine. The plaintiff purchased a motor home from a retailer. The trailer
was manufactured and assembled by the Aspen Coach Corporation and mounted on a
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Chevrolet chassis manufactured by General Motors. On several occasions, the trailer wheel
lug bolts sheared off, causing the dual wheels to fall off the vehicle. Plaintiff sued in strict
liability. The trial court dismissed the claim under the economic loss doctrine. Id. at 987.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, following Santor. Id. at 989. "Since
under § 402A [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] the burden of having cast a defective
product into the stream of commerce falls upon the manufacturer, it appears inconsistent to
limit his responsibility to property other than the product sold." Id.
In John R. Dudley Construction Co. v. Drott Manufacturing Co., 412 N.Y.S.2d 512
(App. Div. 1979), a construction crane suddenly collapsed. This resulted in serious damage
to the crane, but no damage to persons or other property. Holding the event constituted
"property damage," the court distinguished Santor, reasoning that where there is no physical
injury, "it could not be claimed that [the] defendant had committed the tort of marketing a
product which contained a defect that made it, when properly used, dangerous to life or limb
or property." Id. at 515; see also Gainous v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 491 F. Supp. 1345, 1347
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (allowing negligence claim for property damage to defective chattel through
analysis of analogous cases even though court found no Georgia precedent to distinguish
between "economic loss" and "property damage").
Moorman Manufacturing. Co. v. National Tank Co., 414N.E.2d 1302 (I1. 1980), rev'd,
435 N.E.2d 443 (III. 1982), focused on a drain storage tank which cracked after 10 years of
use. The reviewing court determined this was not the type of sudden, dangerous occurrence
best served by tort law policy, rather, the loss was seen as "commercial," a type best handled
by contract Id. at 450. Justice Moran expressed the majority view as follows: When "the
harm relates to the consumer's expectation that a product is of a particular quality so that it
is fit for ordinary use" and the defect is of a qualitative nature, contract law is appropriate.
Id. at 451. To hold the manufacturer "strictly liable in tort for the commercial loss suffered
by a particular purchaser, it would be liable for business losses of other purchasers caused
by the failure of the product to meet the specific needs of their business." Id. at 447. The
majority rejected the suggestion that if there is any physical harm, all losses should be
recoverable. Id. at 452. The concurring opinion suggested that in some instances, plaintiffs
could recover, even in the absence of privity. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 456 (Simon, J.,
concurring). Obviously, the question does not allow for a uniform answer. The proper
approach is to develop a system of warranties out of privity to protect warranty-like, that is
contract-like, interests, while resorting to tort theories to protect tort interests.
In Prairie Production, Inc. v. Agchem Division-Pennwalt Corp., 514 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987), economic losses were not recoverable by a seed corn grower on the basis of
a negligence claim against the manufacturer of a pesticide that failed to eliminate corn
earworms leading to lost profits. The reasoning emphasized a claim for lost profits was
purely economic in nature, and therefore recovery was limited to contract. Id. at 1304.
Further, to allow recovery of economic losses in a tort-based claim would circumvent the
legislative framework set forth in the U.C.C. Id. at 1304-05; see also cases cited supra note
72.
In Detroit Edison Co. v. Nabco, Inc., 35 F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 1994), Detroit Edison, a
utility company, filed suit against Dravo Corporation and Vectura Group, Inc. (collectively,
"Dravo") for damages resulting from the explosion of a 40 foot section of hot reheat pipe
located in a power producing unit. Dravo fabricated and supplied all of the reheat pipe to
Detroit Edison. Detroit Edison sought damages in tort for over $20 million in damages for
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which sellers could evaluate in advance. A part of the truth may be that the
humanitarian basis of the product liability revolution decays into bombast
when the claim is only for property damage."
the cost of repairing or replacing the defective pipe and surrounding machinery; repairing
other machinery and property damaged by the explosion; cleaning up and removing the
asbestos insulation used on the reheat pipe; inspecting all of the reheat pipe; purchasing
replacement power from other utility companies while the damaged power unit was repaired
and inspected and while other units were operating at a reduced capacity to minimize the risk
of another explosion. Id. at 238. Following Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., 486
N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992), the trial court granted summary judgment for the defense, holding
that all of Detroit Edison's tort claims were barred under the economic loss doctrine. Detroit
Edison, 35 F.3d at 238. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding:
[The rule which] emerges from Neibarger significantly narrows the "other
property" exception while expanding the definition of economic loss. Under
Neibarger, tort claims for damage to other property are barred by the economic
loss doctrine if those losses are direct and consequential losses that were within
the contemplation of the parties and that, therefore, could have been the subject
of negotiations between the parties.
Id. at 241 (citing Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 620). The Sixth Circuit reasoned the Michigan
Supreme Court "significantly curtail[ed] the applicability of the 'other property' exception
to the economic loss doctrine, while [simultaneously] expanding the meaning of 'economic
loss."' Id. at 243.
77. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass, 652 F.2d at 1165 (holding seller of front-end loader
liable in tort for defect that caused loader to catch fire, despite fact that it only damaged itself
because fire was sudden and calamitous); Gainous, 491 F. Supp. at 1345 (extending tort
recovery to buyer of plane which malfunctioned in midflight, necessitating emergency landing
resulting in damage to only airplane); Shooshanian, 672 P.2d at 455 (holding tort recovery
was available to buyer of product with dangerous defect, regardless of suddenness of
product's failure); Northern Power, 623 P.2d at 324 (denying recovery to buyer of generator
that seized because there was no evidence of damage to persons or property, and failure
created no risk to persons or property); Cloud, 563 P.2d at 248 (categorizing damage
resulting from fire caused by polyurethane foam rug padding included in mobile home as
recoverable "property damage," and noting that sudden and calamitous damage is generally
put in this category, while deterioration, internal breakage, and depreciation are generally
considered economic loss); Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 443 (refusing recovery under strict
liability by buyer of grain storage tank that developed crack which buyer did not discover
until months later, and distinguishing cases in which defect causes violence or collision with
external objects); Drott, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 512 (holding construction crane that suddenly
collapsed created "property damage," despite fact that it only damaged itself, because it was
dangerous to life or property); Economic Loss, supra note 76, at 917 (arguing defective
radiator that causes fire and destroys plaintiff's store causes economic harm, while radiator
that creates uncomfortable conditions that leads to drop in patronage causes only economic
loss).
Courts may be more inclined to treat loss which is essentially economic as property
damage when the defect at issue creates severe inconvenience for the buyer, even when it
threatens damage only to itself. In Hiigel, the Colorado Supreme Court extended tort
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In other instances, however, the evidence does suggest a genuine risk.
Where the injuries are tangible, it is difficult to quantify the risk in a
mass-produced product. Where an accident does not occur, the risk itself
becomes indistinguishable from the rhetorical effects which the attorney
creates. And even here, those who would change the rule fail to trace the
link between premise and conclusion.
Under traditional law, if negligence or a product defect creates a danger
and yet does no harm in the specific instance, there is no tort.7" Opening
that gate would give anyone who "might" have been hurt a right to sue-an
idea that courts have rejected for centuries."9
At first glance the contention that a defective product is "separate"
from other components of a building or complex machine"0 may seem to
make more sense.8 But hours, if not days of threshold testimony must
recovery to the buyer of a motor home trailer that had to be tested to assess the level of
torque pressure at particular intervals of mileage driven. Hiigel, 544 P.2d at 988.
78. See, e.g., A.J.P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup.
Ct. 1939), afjrd, 28 N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1940); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050 (N.Y. 1916) (refusing tort recovery when the defective product did not cause injury or
property damage).
79. See Harris v. Forklift, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 471 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1991). In
Northridge, the owners of two shopping centers brought suit against the builder of the
shopping malls. Plaintiff purchased the asbestosproduct directly from the general contractor,
not from the manufacturer. Id. at 180. The owners apparently thought they had some kind
of warranty claim because they sued for breach of warranty, as well as under several tort
theories. Id. Plaintiffs claimed the material was defective and unreasonably dangerous; they
incurred increased expenses for inspection, testing, and removal of the material; and they
suffered diminished value of the properties upon sale. Id. The fire coating manufacturer
successfully argued the only damages claimed for economic loss arose from a perceived
problem with the material itself, and thus, recovery on the tort claims was barred. Id. The
circuit court also held that any warranty claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and
it dismissed the action. Northridge, 471 N.W.2d at 180. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
accepted a petition for bypass and reversed. Id. On appeal, the plaintiffs did not argue the
material failed to perform as expected, but rather the asbestos in the product contaminated
the shopping centers, thereby damaging property other than the product itself. Id. The
defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not allege any damage to such property other than the
reduced economic value of the other property resulting from the mere presence of the
material. Id.
81. In East River, the Supreme Court pointed out the complex nature of modem
industrial products would make the rule meaningless if it were limited to individual
components. East River, 476 U.S. at 871. East River was decided under admiralty law.
Therefore, one might posit its holding as non-binding on state courts or even on federal
courts in non-admiralty cases. Nevertheless, the opinion appears persuasive, wholly aside
from Justice Blackmun's analysis beginning with the premise that admiralty law incorporated
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drag by as plaintiffs try to prove the "separable" nature of each "product"
or component.82
general principles of product liability law. Id. at 863.
In King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030
(1989), the Third Circuit considered the "separability" of a product under East River. The
plaintiff farmers purchased seed potatoes which failed to germinate when they were treated
by another farmer with a chemical manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 1049. The
plaintiffs premised their tort claim on the idea that the chemical and the seed potatoes were
separate products. Since the chemical damaged the seed potatoes, the "product" did not
"injure only itself' for the purposes of applying East River. Id. at 1051. The jury found for
the plaintiffs because Hilton-Davis failed to warn the plaintiffs of the properties of the
chemical that caused the failure. Id. at 1049. The Third Circuit reversed, holding the
relevant "product" in the context of the East River rule is the product purchased by the
plaintiffs (the treated seed potatoes), rather than the product sold by the defendant (the
chemical). Id. at 1051. Thus, the "product" involved in the case "injured only itself," and
under East River, the plaintiff farmers were limited to the warranty provided by the seller of
the treated seed potatoes. King, 855 F.2d at 1051.
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected a separability argument in Northern Power &
Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981). In that case, a low oil
pressure shutdown mechanism in a tractor failed, causing the engine to overheat and seize.
The plaintiff argued the shut-down mechanism damaged another "component part" of the
engine, and thus caused the property damage. The court rejected this "separate product"
argument in cases where the components are provided by one supplier as part of a complete
and integrated package. Id. at 330. "Since all but the very simplest of machines have
component parts, such a broad holding would require a finding of 'property damage' in
virtually every case where a product damages itself. ...[and would] eliminate the
distinction between warranty and strict products liability." Id.
Separability issues also arise in the context of construction projects, which combine the
"products" of architects, engineers, suppliers, subcontractors, and general contractors. Even
the completed building may be separable from the property on which it is located, as the
plaintiffs in a 1983 Montana case argued. See Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy &
Assocs., Inc., 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mont. 1983) (allowing recovery from builders of arena under
strict liability when arena collapsed because value of leasehold, a separable piece of property,
reduced).
82. Tony Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 444 N.W.2d 743, 747
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989). In Spychalla, a potato farmer brought a strict liability action against
the manufacturer of a dust designed to prevent potatoes from rotting. As a result of applying
the dust, the farmer's potatoes petrified. The plaintiff did not claim the manufacturer's potato
dust failed to prevent the potatoes from rotting. Rather, the plaintiff claimed that the product
actually injured the potatoes by causing them to petrify. The Spychalla court recognized an
exception to the economic loss doctrine, finding it inapplicable where an allegedly defective
product caused actual damage to other property. See also D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith
Harvestore Products, 475 N.W.2d 587 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). Farmers brought suit against
the manufacturer and retailer of a "Harvestore" system. A "Harvestore" system is a large
grain silo for preserving and storing feed for livestock. Among the plaintiffs' claims against
the manufacturer and retailer were claims of negligence and strict liability. The trial court
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There would also be a less tangible cost: the decline of the moral
authority of the trial system. In a building product controversy, for
example, the judge could conclude that the seller of concrete would be liable
to the buyer of a house. 4 In a different court, the holding might be that
granted summary judgment for the defendants, because the only losses were economic. On
appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the alleged defective nature of the Harvestore system
caused damage to feed stored in the system and to their livestock. They contended this
constituted damage to other property. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding
their alleged damages were economic losses not exempted by the "other property" exception.
Id. at 595. The court stated, "[t]he expected function of the Harvestore was to enrich the
feed, providing enhanced nutrition for the cows. The damages stem from the failure of the
Harvestore to perform 'as expected,'.. . and not from 'injury to another person or property."'
Id. (quoting Tony Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 444 N.W.2d 743, 746
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989)).
83. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1542 (1973).
84. Commentators trace the modem basis of the builder's liability to Kellogg Bridge
Co. v. Hamilton, I 10 U.S. 108 (1884). The bridge company agreed to build a bridge for the
railroad. The work began with the construction of "false work" (essentially platforms) in the
river. The company contracted with Hamilton to finish the work. Hamilton paid the
company for the work completed until that point. The "false work" inadequate and one
platform sank under the weight of the bridge. River currents destroyed a second platform.
Hamilton sued and recovered damages for the defective structures. The Supreme Court held
the bridge company made no representations as to the "false work" in place, but found it
portrayed itself as competent enough to build such structures. Id. at 117. The deficiencies
in the "false work" were unknown and undiscoverable until the foundations were subjected
to practical testing in the course of construction. Under those circumstances, the Court held
the bridge company breached an implied warranty that the "false work" would be "reasonably
suitable" for such use as was contemplated by both parties. Id. at 119. The Hamilton court
relied on analogies to warranties implied in the sale of goods and treated the transaction at
issue as a "sale" of the "false work" by the bridge company to Hamilton. The Court stated:
[The false work] was constructed for a particular purpose, and was sold to
accomplish that purpose; and it is intrinsically just that the company, which held
itself out as possessing the requisite skill to do work of that kind, and therefore
as having special knowledge of its own workmanship, should be held to
indemnify its vendee against latent defects, arising from the mode of construc-
tion, and which the latter, as the company well knew, could not, by any inspec-
tion, discover for himself.
ld.; see William K. Jones, Economic Losses Caused by Construction Deficiencies: The
Competing Regimes of Contract and Tort, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1051 (1991) (suggesting
Hamilton's theme was reiterated a century later in Hartley v. Ballou, 209 S.E.2d 776 (N.C.
1974)). In Hartley, the basement of the dwelling, which Hartley purchased from the builder,
flooded during rainy weather. Ballou, the builder, made extensive repairs, and as a result the
basement stayed dry during hurricanes and periods of extraordinarily heavy rain. The court
held the buyer could recover his damages from the initial flooding, but not for damages
associated with subsequent episodes. Hartley, 209 S.E.2d at 776. The implied warranty only
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applied to latent defects, not to those which would be visible on reasonable inspection of the
dwelling. Moreover, the implied warranty was not an absolute guarantee against flooding in
the event of hurricanes or other extreme weather conditions. See also George v. Veach, 313
S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 1984). In George, the builder breached the implied warranty that a
residential home would be fit for human habitation when the septic system failed. The court
opined that the implied warranty imposed strict liability on the warrantor. Id. at 922.
Professor Jones criticizes this decision, suggesting that the failure of the septic tank was no
more than an "economic loss"-a diminution in the value of the purchased property not
accompanied by injury to person or other property. Jones, supra, at 1056. While Professor
Jones recognizes holdings of economic loss as an inappropriate basis for an action in tort, he
urges the matter requires further analysis and not mere analogy. Id. Thus, he suggests the
court was correct in referring to an "asymmetry" in the information available to the buyer
and the seller. The seller is in a better position than the buyer to learn of the defects or the
potential defects. The buyer could hire experts and conduct inspections to test the soundness
of the property to be purchased, but the buyer and his experts are not normally present during
the construction when most of the information about any defects is not hidden from view.
Moreover, Jones suggests it is socially wasteful to impose an obligation on the buyer to do
extensive tests to learn what the seller already knows or could have easily ascertained. Id.;
see also City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978) (refusing to apply
such a warranty in suit against an architect, although recognizing the city could sue a building
contractor for such a defect). The City of Mounds court noted that:
Architects ... deal in somewhat inexact sciences and are continually called upon
to exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate and provide for random
factors which are incapable of precise measurement. .. . Because of the inescap-
able possibility of error which inheres in these services, the law has traditionally
required, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and judgment
which can be reasonably expected from similarly situated professionals.
Id. at 424; see also Huang v. Garner, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984) (denying recovery in
warranty, yet permitting recovery under negligence theory emphasizing: 1) foreseeability of
harm to purchaser; 2) extent to which transaction was meant to effect plaintiff; 3) certainty
that plaintiff suffered injury; 4) closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and
injury suffered; 5) moral blame attached to defendant's conduct; and 6) policy permitting
future harm); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng'r, Inc., 136 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding engineer's contract with water district made successful project bidder intended
beneficiary, permitting it to sue engineer in contract for damages suffered when engineer
prepared documents in late and defective manner); Witty v. Schramm, 379 N.E.2d 333 (Iii.
App. Ct. 1979) (refusing recovery for breach of implied warranty of habitability for discovery
of subsurface waters that hampered construction because neither party has such knowledge
and no one was at fault); cf. Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 151 So. 2d 767 (Ala. 1963)
(permitting an implied warranty claim against a civil engineer who warranted the "sufficiency
and adequacy of the plans and specifications to reasonably accomplish the purpose for which
they were intended" and distinguishing engineering work from the professionalism at issue
in City of Mounds, reasoning it is far less subject to factors beyond the control of the
professional); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402-03 (Fla. 1973) (rejecting
premise that design professional's contract was intended to benefit any one other than
contracting parties absent clear intent of parties as evidenced by terms of contract); Jordan
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the seller of plywood or electrical wiring is not subject to tort claims
because it is a separate product. Each ruling could follow from characteris-
tics which one judge thought critical on that particular day and in that
particular context. But the public would not have faith in a principle of law
which produced different outcomes in similar transactions.
X. WHO IS THE HAND AND WHO IS THE EYE?
Whether or not it is wise, the impetus for change arises from a humane
impulse. But at what point must the courts leave those profound matters to
the elected branch? We add little to the vast literature on that question,85
other than to say that product liability law is notoriously vague. The task
of trial judges and intermediate appellate courts is to decide a particular case
on a relatively traditional, limited nature, such as the existence of a statute
of limitation, a waiver, or the particular product's failure, regarding the
adequacy or inadequacy of a defect. If the economic loss rule were to
vanish or weaken significantly, even these islands of certainty in the product
liability sea would shrink. Judges would have to operate on a border
between law, technology, and public policy. They would have no guidance
other than benign emanations from earlier, different cases which had dealt
with clear-cut injustices and a demonstrated need for action.
There is more at stake, remember, than technical jurisdiction. A broad
shift away from contract principles must clash with the constitutional ideal
of comity between the branches of the government.
In the past decade, state legislatures have enacted a wide variety of tort
reform measures. 6 Their common denominator is the intent to cut back
the scope of liability and to impose specific limitations on key aspects of
damages. The courts would mock that legislative initiative by broadening
tort liability and creating difficult new issues of damages across an already
ill-defined spectrum.
v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding seller breached implied warranty
where it was later determined flooding was so prevalent in area that house he built was
worthless and emphasizing: 1) seller had subdivided land; 2) seller was real estate develop-
ment professional; 3) seller was in better position to leave lot undeveloped and, hence, absorb
losses; and 4) seller knew of natural water course and was in better position to use
information).
85. The courts regard controversies of that type as the constitutional prerogative of the
legislative branch. See generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRIsIs OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
86. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
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There are considerations of institutional expertise and resources as well.
The proponents of change do not quantify the costs of their proposal, or the
economic impact that the shift in the doctrine would have. For that matter,
they offer little data as to the number of cases which would be decided
differently,87 or even specifics as to how the new results would be fairer,
or more socially beneficial. To the extent a court accepts those arguments,
it acts on the basis of predictions of social consequences which are
essentially guesswork.
At some stage, even necessary guesses, educated or irresponsible,
become indistinguishable from managerial or political decisions. If that lack
of information were unavoidable, courts might have to act in partial
ignorance for the sake of doing justice. There is no such necessity. Other
constitutional branches have the resources to gather data and to assess the
merits of competing solutions.
The legislative staff's function is to gather expert opinions concerning
technical and economic factors."8 Equally important, is the legislators'
ability to focus on a particular question and formulate a remedy that is
tailored to broad social needs rather than the plight of an isolated litigant.89
At the level of implementation, federal and state agencies, rather than an
individual attorney, can make a more realistic and fair evaluation of the
costs and benefits to both individuals and the public.
XI. THE POSSIBILITY OF LESS DISRUPTIVE ALTERNATIVES
The prominent issue of contract or tort tends to obscure the important
technical questions. For instance, one commentator has suggested that since
building contractors are prone to bankruptcy, a shift to a tort doctrine would
87. Returning to the construction cases, plaintiffs have often brought lawsuits against
their builders, general contractors, and architects. They do not tell the courts why those suits,
each permissible under existing law, would not give them reasonable compensation for
whatever losses they may have suffered.
88. Bills are accompanied by a statement of economic impact to aid the legislative staff
in this task. See FLA. STAT. § 11.075 (1993).
89. If the object is to govern future conduct, the task may be accomplished better
through administrative regulations or statutes, each of which expresses public goals arrived
at by the public's elected representatives or their deputies. This ideal may not be achieved
in every instance, but the serious question is whether the task should be entrusted to judges
or even juries, neither of which are elected. Note, it is common for economic loss rule
controversies to arise in the context of regulated industries. See Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
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reduce the danger for the ultimate purchasers of building materials.9"
Legislators could enact statutory reform, focusing more closely on the
specific problem, 9' such as an increase in the performance bond require-
ment. That approach, tailored to the individual problem, would be both
more effective and less dangerous than a sweeping change from a contract
to a tort doctrine.92
As another example, the objections and difficulties previously discussed
might be brought under control if the reform impulse were expressed
through the abolition of the vertical privity requirement in existing warranty
law.93 The effect would be to put the buyer in the same position as a
sophisticated commercial purchaser. This would be consistent with both
traditional law and the expectations which a business has in launching a
product. On the other hand, the change would not undermine express
waivers or limitations of warranty. Nor would it subject sellers to
unmeasured damages.
The question, however, is not an easy one.94 The authors suggest that
it should be addressed only on its own merits. If treating the validity of a
privity requirement is dependent upon a philosophical debate over the
virtues of contract and tort law, then neither side is likely to reexamine the
policy aspects of the particular question. Such an examination, supposedly,
is a hallmark of modem law.95
90. Michael D. Leider, Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic
Loss: Building on Cardoza & Coase, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 937, 1016 (1991).
91. Compare the specific reforms in various recent tort reform statutes such as Florida's
Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986. See Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1080.
92. Indeed, the California Supreme Court made precisely those limited adjustments in
Seely. The policy in product liability analysis is to advance the interests of plaintiffs by
resolving future issues in favor of the plaintiff.
93. In fact, that was the approach the New Jersey court took in Spring Motors. The
change in existing law would not be radical. The U.C.C. is neutral as to the vertical privity
requirement. See section 2-318 and the express statement in the comments to this section
explaining that the provision is not meant to limit the "developing case law" which tends to
diminish the requirements of privity. See Parker, supra note 4, at 410.
94. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 69, § 11-5, at 463 (exemplifying buyer who
obtains goods secondhand from intervening vendor to support that the question is debatable
and consequential economic losses should be denied to buyer not in privity).
95. The closer the focus, the better. If the basic fact pattern is characterized as a
question of privity, there are overtones of archaic learning that cut off the rights of the buyer
for no practical purpose. On the other hand, when the general idea is expressed in terms of
the absence of face-to-face dealings and the lack of opportunity for either side to bargain, the
fundamental considerations seem more appealing.
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XII. GOALS OR ANALYSIS
"General propositions do not decide concrete cases."96 The proposal
that the economic loss rule be abolished endures, in part, becausejudges and
attorneys have been conditioned to think of the expansion of product
liability as the path of the future. Moreover, they give exaggerated
deference to insights which were appropriate to the pioneering decisions.
In a sense, they confuse the ends of product liability law with the means.
Our thesis is not that those insights are necessarily wrong or outdated, but
that they cannot effectively provide the tools for the analysis of every
controversy.
A. Compensation
To say compensation for an injured party is a traditional objective of
tort law97 is not to demonstrate that the buyer should recover in tort.98
Rather, in its more brutally direct form, the argument is that the change
would make it easier for the plaintiff to win. But that would be an effect,
not a reason. The change in the balance of power cannot be a policy
argument in and of itself.
There is a need for a closer and more skeptical look at the related
suggestion that courts should give homeowners, fishermen, or any other
category of litigant favored treatment across the board. In other fields of
law, the starting point for analysis is not the status of the claimant99 but the
circumstances of the individual matter. The impulse reflects the belief that
"homeowners," as well as other groups, suffer from a disparity in bargaining
power. Accordingly, the courts can and should correct this imbalance.
However, there are flaws in the syllogism. If it were taken literally, the
contention would mean courts should find for homeowners in every other
instance, regardless of facts or law. There are few cases in which the
individual buyer would have "greater bargaining power" over a corporate
96. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97. See RICHARD A. POSSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20 (4th ed 1988).
98. See generally Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control
of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980). The author notes "risks of over deterrence
are heightened when there is no certain expenses, such as the installation of known
technology, that will avoid the liability with certainty." Id. at 25-26. Similarly, the
conclusory statement that the buyer's expectations were not met does not identify a test which
trial courts could apply. Often it is only a label for the result reached for other unstated
reasons.
99. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) (proposing that the
circumstances, not the status of the claimant controls).
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seller."1 In any event, the leading cases agree that relative bargaining
power is not the touchstone of the economic loss rule, nor even an
element. 1 ' And were the law different in principle, trial judges would still
face difficulties.
The concept of relative bargaining power is itself indistinct and
subjective. It is a function of talent, resources, luck and other intangibles
inherent in a vast array of relationships. Leading cases such as Spring
Motors and Seely show that judges who lead the charge for product liability
can differ in their evaluation of the balance of power even where the
business relationships are relatively straightforward.
0 2
Beyond that, reliance on "policy" combines with limitations inherent
in the trial process itself to make the assessment of relative bargaining
power a rudimentary exchange for lawyers' arguments based upon stereo-
types. Delphic rulings by trial judges denying or granting summary
judgment without explanation could offer little or no precedent for the next
case, much less guidance to business.
100. The occasional Astor who lost an eye to a champagne cork would not make the
generality invalid. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability,
33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980) (criticizing the "one directional" nature of other arguments
which frequently are offered in support of plaintiff oriented proposals for changes in products
liability law); see also Edward T. O'Donnell, Public Policy and the Burden of Proof in
Enhanced Injury Litigation: A Case Study in the Dangers of Trends and Easy Assumptions,
17 W. ST. U. L. REv. 325 (1990); David G. Ownen, Products Liability: Principles ofJustice
for the 21st Century, 11 PACE L. REV. 63 (1990) (elaborating on the same theme).
101. In Spring Motors, the court sometimes spoke of equal bargaining power and the
ability to spread the loss as prerequisites to contract. Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 670-71.
The New Jersey Supreme Court specified "perfect parity is not necessary to a determination
that the parties have substantially equal bargaining positions," and further, a commercial
purchaser "may be better situated than the manufacturer to factor into its price the risk of
economic loss caused by the purchase of a defective product" 1d. at 671. Thus, if
commercial purchasers miscalculate their risk when bargaining for their contract or err in risk
allocation by not purchasing appropriate insurance, the consequences are not to be borne by
the manufacturer under a false or fictitious tort theory. The law of warranty is not limited
to parties in a somewhat equal bargaining position. Such a limitation is not supported by the
language and history of the sales act and is unworkable. Moreover, it finds no support in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
102. The fact the dealership could select a Clark transmission for the Ford trucks it
bought showed significant bargaining power to some members of the court, but to another
member of the court, the same facts showed the manufacturer only chose to make the
component available as an option. See Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 678 (Handler, J.,
concurring); see also Brown & Feinman, supra note 10, at 348-59 (discussing the thoughtful
debate between the majority and concurring opinions and the academic benefits of relational
analysis).
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B. Deterrence-Goal or Mirage?
Plaintiffs suggest that giving property holders the right to sue in tort
rather than contract would advance the cause of product safety. Their
premise is that existing law does not give an owner reason to repair
dangerous conditions before an accident occurs. On the contrary, the
opposite is true. A property holder knows full well that he or she may be
sued if someone is injured on the premises. In Casa Clara, for instance,
each of the corporate amici,"° which supported the plaintiffs, took care
to assure the appellate court that its workers had repaired the roofs in
dispute before the company sought legal remedies against suppliers further
back in the distribution chain. There is no reason to think other businesses,
equally public spirited, or just as worried about their products' reputation,
would not have taken similar precautions.
On the other hand, at least one consequence of a shift from contract to
strict liability is clear. The change would tell manufacturers that greater
care would not be a defense.'0 4 Then, where lies the incentive for those
businesses to take greater care?
One of the early critics of the economic loss rule, Justice Peters,
remarked that the threat of a strict liability claim could not be a significant
deterrent to businessmen who already know that they are subject to suits for
negligence or breach of contract.0 5 On similar lines, it is significant that
the product liability revolution has reduced qualitative standards of proof of
causation and defect." 6 The purpose and effect of that change is to make
it easier for plaintiffs to recover. But the same dilution of proof must make
it more difficult for a manufacturer to interpret society's message. The
product should have been safer, but in what way and at what cost?0 7
103. The reference is to those participants who joined in the attack on the economic loss
rule.
104. Strict liability subjects the seller to judgment even if the seller "has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product .. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402(A)(2)(a) (1965),
105. Seely, 403 P.2d at 152-58 (Peters, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
106. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Edward T. O'Donnell, Design
Litigation and Strict Liability: The Problem of Jury Instructions Which Do Not Instruct, 56
U. DET. J. URB. L. 1052 (1979).
107. See generally Edward T. O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art:
Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627 (1978).
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C. Higher Prices-The Skull Behind the Mask
Eventually, arguments for the expansion of tort remedies will lead to
the development of a system in which product liability costs can be shared
among all consumers through higher product prices. Familiar and reassuring
as the litany may be, it goes too far. If that were all there were to it, every
product liability issue would be decided in favor of a plaintiff. The change
must increase the number of lawsuits-and the costs of insurance and the
products themselves-if it is to serve its doctrinal purpose. Isolated and
infrequent cases could not distribute the loss effectively.
And, in ordinary speech, higher prices are not a public benefit. When
prices go up, fewer people can buy goods and the manufacturer must restrict
its production and lay off workers. Given that reality, it is not self-evident
why hypothetical buyers need a tort remedy, in addition to the contract
rights they already possess. Nor is it clear that a court would help even
favored groups such as potential home owners, if it were to take steps
leading to an increase in the prices of building materials. The ordinary
citizen would have to make a larger down payment in order to buy a home.
Many would not be able to do so.
D. Insurance and the Sharing of Pain
A more abstract and sophisticated variant, the concept of the manufac-
turer as a superior risk distributor,"0 8 has gained numbing force through
repetition." 9 Yet Dean Prosser terms this a "make weight," even as to
personal injury."0 Other commentators"' point out that the reasoning,
if valid, must apply whenever anyone is injured by a superior risk-bearer,
and that logic would call for a governmental compensation scheme for all
108. See Emerson G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enter., 732 F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir.
1984); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.
1980).
109.
The manufacturer knows the purpose for which its product is to be used and by
whom. Although all purchasers are not identical, the manufacturer can
determine within a reasonable range of predictability the ramifications of a
product failure for the ordinary user. Having this information, the manufacturer
can include in its cost the expense of adequate insurance coverage.
Emerson, 732 F.2d at 1474.
110. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 799-800 (1966).
111. See Owen, supra note 100, at 707.
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resulting injuries. That formulation is extreme, to the point of being a
caricature, and not what the proponents of the change desire. However,
bounds have not yet been set to prevent well-intentioned reforms from
surging beyond their original purposes. Instead, the arguments for risk
distribution dwindle toward assertions that the law could be changed without
hardship.
The magical painkiller is said to be "insurance." Yet, courts have
assured manufacturers and other defendants a thousand times that they will
not be subjected to an insurer's liability. 2 That language must degener-
ate into incantation if judges now were to create a whole new spectrum of
liabilities on the basis that defendants could buy insurance. 3
To be fair, it is not only plaintiffs' advocates who have been lulled by
superficial talk of insurance. In East River, Justice Blackmun supported his
refusal to alter the economic loss rule by writing that the seller of a product
could buy insurance against liability. The observation gained resonance
from its seeming consistency with product liability lore. Yet on closer
inspection, there is no difference between tort and contract to the extent that
the question is one of theoretical insurability." Indeed, the expectation
that a manufacturer will obtain coverage, or self-insure through higher
prices, for personal injury liability against third parties is one of the more
widely accepted premises for the expansion of tort liability.
112. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86 (Fla. 1976); Royal v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 211 So.
2d 214 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402(A) cmt. g (1965); W. Page
Keeton, Products Liability--Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX.
L. REV. 855, 858 (1963).
113. There is potential for unfairness. As one example of an obvious injustice, the
effect might be to subject insurers to a new form of liability long after they negotiated their
rates and the state approved them-an obvious injustice. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700, 701-02 (Fla. 1993). See generally Owen,
supra note 101, at 681 (demonstrating the inadequacy of the more general assumption that
the expansion of tort liability can be based upon the availability of insurance).
114. If the seller of a product can buy a policy against personal injury liability, as
Justice Blackmun asserts, it can insure against claims by the buyer of disappointed economic
expectations. However, Brown and Feinman state insurance is not available for such a claim.
Brown & Feinman, supra note 10, at 341. The difference may be explained by the fact that
Justice Blackmun cites admiralty authorities for the availability of insurance: perhaps there
are special maritime policies. That coverage is still common, even though expensive and it
may be more prevalent than that against the costs attributable to the disappointed expectations
of a buyer. Recent studies suggest 86% of the country's 500 largest corporations purchase
some form of commercial casualty insurance. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis
in Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1561 (1987).
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Justice Blackmun was correct insofar as he spoke of a difference in
degree. But scholars challenge the factual and logical conclusions he would
draw from that distinction.
15
As have so many others, Professor Priest deplores the high cost of tort
litigation. ' He goes further, however, to question its practicality as a
means to accomplish either insurance, compensatory, or regulatory
functions.17
The traditional argument is that the availability of insurance justifies the
expansion of tort liability. Priest's answer is that the expansion of tort
115. Some question the relative distribution power among the parties to the transaction,
suggesting the buyer is in a better position to buy insurance against the loss because of the
greater knowledge of the context in which the product must do the work. William K. Jones,
Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract Over Tort, 44 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 731, 765 (1990).
The standard casualty policy protects the buyer from losses associated with
accidents caused by product failures, without segregation of risks or charges.
The premium on such policies will be related to the value of the buyer's
property and the general risk involved in the buyer's activities. These are
matters about which the seller has limited knowledge and almost no control. As
to such losses, the buyer is in the best position to obtain optimal coverage under
its own policy, described as first party insurance....
The avoidance of unnecessary transaction costs is a major advantage of
having the buyer look to its own insurance company. Litigation over the
liability of the seller can consume substantial resources, whether the suit is
ultimately resolved in favor of the buyer or the seller.
... As to the consequences of the defect, the buyer exercises significant
control, both in the manner in which the product is used and in precautions
taken to avoid loss (such as periodic inspections and sensitivity to signs of
trouble). In sum, the problem is one of joint care. In such cases, it is not
possible to devise a liability rule that is optimal in all instances. For example,
the diligence of the seller may be enhanced by increasing the probability that the
seller will be held accountable for losses resulting from product defects. But the
enhancement of seller diligence comes at the expense of buyer caution ....
Id. at 765-67 (footnote omitted).
116. Putting that concern in quantitative terms, he adds that the administrative costs of
tort liability amounts to about 53% of the plaintiffs net recovery of benefits, whereas
comparable insurance arrangements have an expense figure closer to 10%. Priest, supra note
114, at 1560.
117. Id. Priest also suggests that the burden of the change may fall disproportionately
on the poor. Id. They receive less benefit through litigation since pain and suffering and
disability payments are highly correlated with the individual's expected future income, while
the insurance premium (ultimately incorporated in the price of the product) is set for the
average loss. Id. at 1559. Conversely, the increases in prices which are necessary to
accomplish the insurance function have a severe impact on them. Id. at 1525.
39
O'Donnell et al.: On the Differences Between Blood and Red Ink: A Second Look at th
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
liability in fact makes insurance less available." 8 The commentator goes
118. Professor Priest reminds us that deterrence is different from insurance and the two
functions are not necessarily consistent. Priest, supra note 114, at 1525. In an oversimplified
outline, his analysis is that it is not the simple increase in the amount of judgments which
undermines the insurance market, but the tendency for expanded liability to undermine the
advantages of the scale of the ability to predict the consequences and to apply the "law of
large numbers" and for the tendency for higher premiums to drive low risk insureds to
become self insurers, thus reducing the size of the pool of insureds and the cost for others.
That process in turn feeds on itself as the fees grow higher, making it questionable whether
the next level of insureds have a reason to stay with the carrier rather than become a self
insurer. Id. at 1525-45. The central concept is the idea that the insurance defense depends
upon the attendance of risks, and that the broadening of tort liability tends to eliminate the
distinctions among risks, all are thrown together into a huge pool.
Consumers who systematically face a lower injury probability are likely to find
the insurance provided with the product or service not worth its added premium.
Many commentators have tended to view product-or service-related injuries as
occurring randomly, generating an equal injury probability to each consumer.
Many product-and service-related injuries, however, are systematically associated
with particular product uses. Most modem products can be employed in a wide
range of diverse activities. Those consumers who use products in typically less,
rather than more, risky ways are likely to drop out of the consumer pool if tort
law requires the manufacturer to insure all customer uses. These consumers will
shift to alternative products or services that cannot be used in equally risky
ways-products which, as a consequence, will be cheaper because of the lower
attendant insurance premiums.
A familiar modem example is consumers use of four-wheel drive vehicles.
In recent years, the liability of manufacturers of such vehicles has been
expanded under design defect and warning law and, more generally, as courts
have limited the defense of contributory negligence, misuse and assumption of
risk....
Manufacturers must respond to this increased liability either by changing
product design to protect drivers in extreme conditions or by increasing
insurance coverage for the consumer set as a whole. Whether the manufacturer
changes the design or merely increases insurance coverage, product costs will
increase and the product price will increase. The price increase, of course, may
seem desirable for consumers who drive in extreme back road conditions. But
consumers who purchase four-wheel drive vehicles for any other purposes...
[for] driving on snowy or muddy roads-may not find the increased price
worthwhile. These consumers could be lured away if they were offered a four-
wheel drive vehicle suitable for snow and mud, but not for extreme grades
which, if only because of the lower attendant insurance premium, could be
offered at a lower price. It is not surprising that many manufacturers have
begun offering van and station wagon models with a four-wheel drive option.
Id. at 1564-65 (footnotes omitted); see also Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilock, Punitive
Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 778 (1989); Jones,
supra note 115, at 731; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14
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on to explain that insurance rates are set by predictions of future losses and
that increased tort liability tends to force low-risk participants out of the
insurance pool. 19 This, in turn, drives up premiums across a broad range,
making some activities too expensive to continue. 20  He suggests, as well,
that the comparative advantage which insurance companies have in the
aggregation of risks-one of the theoretical foundations of the industry-is
overwhelmed by the coverage obligations which tort law inflicts upon them
as well as the concomitant reduction in their ability to segregate risks.
J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985).
119.
This process is adverse selection in the product market. . . . Because the
manufacturer was prohibited byproduct liability law from making this additional
insurance optional, low-risk consumers within the pool-those not intending to
expose themselves to backcountry risks-dropped out of the pool, either by
shifting to domestic four-wheels, or by declining to buy the product at all.
When low risk consumers drop out, the insurance premiums added to the price
of backcountry four-wheels must be increased by an ever greater amount.
The second set of low-risk consumers affected by the expansion of
provider liability are the low-income or poor, who bring low risk to a liability
insurance pool because of the lower damages they will receive because of their
lower income and poorer future employment prospects. As the insurance
premiums tied to products and services increase, these consumers also drop out
because the price they must pay is increasingly greater than the value received.
Such consumers will shift to substitute products . . . Again, as this set of
low-risk consumers drops out, the attendant insurance premiums must be
commensurately increased.
Adverse selection and consumer risk... also provides the only explana-
tion of why increases in corporate tort liability compel providers to withdraw
products and services from markets altogether. Again, if there were no adverse
selection, increases in insurance premiums or self-insurance costs could largely
be passed on to consumers. Sales may decline, as must be expected from any
price increase, but there would be no reason to withdraw products from the
market. There is a different effect, however, where a price increase derives
from increasing risk pool variance. Increasing variance generates adverse
selection by low-risk consumers who successively drop out of the pool. The
pool, as a consequence, unravels. At some point, demand for the product sold
with the necessary insurance premium simply disappears. There remains no set
of identifiable consumers to whom the product or service is worth its price.
.. . The large number of products and services that have been totally
withdrawn from markets demonstrate the severity of the effects of contemporary
tort law's shift to the third-party insurance mechanism.
Priest, supra note 114, at 1565-67.
120. Id. at 1569-70 (providing asbestos production as an example).
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XIII. CONCLUSION
Product liability law rests on the moral perception that the economic
burdens of death or incapacitation are too much for an individual. But in
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,' that exception transformed itself
into a norm for commercial transactions in which no one is injured.
Disturbing in itself, the metamorphosis illustrates a recurring paradox.
The field traditionally is thought to be governed by a sense of practical
justice which cuts through technical limitations and restraints. Yet as a new
principle gains acceptance, advocates shove practical difficulties to the
background and urge the courts to carry the approach to extremes in
deference to its theoretical basis.'22
At least in the instance of the economic loss rule, that reasoning has
grown conclusory and even circular. Ignoring the need for empirical
evidence of social need and effect, courts too often react automatically to
slogans of past product liability battles.
To the unfriendly eye, this is little better than the Mandarin theorizing
which led Traynor and other reformers to take up arms decades ago. Over-
used, the Marseillaise has decayed into Muzak.
121. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
122. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process and the Jury, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 975 (1989).
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